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Social Science and the Analysis of Environmental Policy

Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania
Shana Starobin
Bowdoin College

Abstract
As much as environmental problems manifest themselves as problems with the natural
environment, environmental problems—and their solutions—are ultimately social and
behavioral in nature. Just as the natural sciences provide a basis for understanding the need
for environmental policy and informing its design, the social sciences also contribute in
significant ways to the understanding of the behavioral sources of environmental problems,
both in terms of individual incentives and collective action challenges. In addition, the social
sciences have contributed much to the understanding of the ways that laws and other
institutions can be designed to solve environmental problems. In this paper, we distill core
intellectual frameworks from among the social sciences that scaffold modern environmental
policy in industrialized country contexts—focusing on key contributions principally from
political science, economics, psychology, and sociology to the analysis of environmental
problems and their solutions. These frameworks underlie how environmental problems are
defined at multiple scales and the conceptualization and empirical testing of policy solutions
that seek to shape human behavior in ways that improve environmental quality and promote
sustainable economic growth. With the planet facing continued environmental threats,
improving environmental policy decision making depends on the insights and frameworks of
social science research in addition to those of the natural sciences.
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Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania
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Starting as early as the middle of the twentieth century, public values toward the
environment have shifted greatly across the developed world. Both elites and members of the
public have increasingly grown aware of and concerned about harms to public health and the
environment from industrialization and urbanization (Inglehart, 1997). A series of new
political and governmental institutions, ranging from specialized government regulatory
agencies to green political parties to well-established nongovernmental advocacy
organizations, have come into existence, and, in many countries, extensive laws and
regulations have been established to address environmental concerns. In the name of
environmental justice, marginalized communities have voiced their concerns and organized
themselves in increasingly nuanced ways to challenge untenable status quos in their local
backyards. Increasing international attention has also emerged over global environmental
problems, including climate change and its associated implications for natural disasters,
agricultural production, and ecosystem viability.
The contributions of the natural sciences to advancing environmental policy have been
apparent in multiple ways—not the least being in the visible integration of scientific expertise
into the identification of environmental problems and the understanding of the chemical,
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biological, and ecological relationships that underlie these problems. But at the same time,
the social sciences have likewise made many contributions to the understanding of the
sources of environmental problems, identifying them principally in individual and collective
human behavior. The social sciences have also contributed much to understanding the ways
that laws and other institutions can be designed to solve environmental problems—and the
opportunities and challenges associated with implementation. With the planet facing
continued environmental threats, policy research related to the environment depends in
important ways on the insights and frameworks of social science research in addition to
research from the natural sciences. As much as environmental problems may manifest
themselves as problems with the natural environment, in reality environmental problems—
and their solutions—are ultimately social and behavioral ones.
In this paper, we distill core social science frameworks that undergird modern
environmental policy analysis in industrialized country contexts—focusing on key
contributions from political science, economics, psychology, and sociology. In so doing, we
recognize that, as an umbrella term, the “social sciences” encompass a heterogeneous group
of disciplines, each operating according to different sets of underlying assumptions, methods,
and norms as knowledge producing, epistemic communities. A variety of social science
disciplines, including anthropology, geography, and political ecology, have contributed key
conceptual, normative, and empirical insights to understanding environmental politics,
governance, and development. In this paper, we focus on a subset of social sciences that have
been central to the approaches embraced by policymakers and analysts situated at the
forefront of making environmental policy decisions in the increasingly technocratic settings
of the developed world. In this respect, our discussion centers on those frameworks that
underlie how environmental problems are defined at multiple scales and the
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conceptualization and empirical testing of policy solutions that seek to shape human behavior
in ways that improve environmental quality and promote sustainable economic growth. As
policies and institutions developed in industrialized contexts diffuse—for better or worse—to
emerging economies seeking to establish or enhance their own domestic regulatory states,
there is an even greater need for scholars, students, and practitioners to reflect on the
underlying disciplinary insights and assumptions upon which such approaches are based—
and to discern both the strengths and limitations of transferring policies, laws, norms, and
other institutions across geophysical and political borders and institutional contexts. The
social sciences we review here have been pivotal to the analysis of environmental policy
decisions in many settings around the world.

I. Environmental Problems

Central to the study and practice of any domain of public policy is defining the
problem to be addressed (Bardach & Patashnik, 2015). How environmental problems are
framed may shape the set of policy alternatives proposed as possible solutions or the
outcomes that policy can achieve.
Under one framing, environmental quality is an intrinsic moral good—a right or
interest that inheres in nature itself, irrespective of the value humans place on ecosystems,
species, or environmental conditions (Naess, 1973; Rolston, 1988; Attfield, 2014). Such a
view undergirded the New Zealand government’s decision in 2017 to designate the
Whanganui river—the country’s third-largest—as a living entity, affording it the same legal
rights as a person (Gordon 2018). Under another conception of value, environmental quality
constitutes a fundamental human right, a building block of individual capabilities (Holland,
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2008). Still another way of conceiving environmental problems has been closely associated
with aspirations for sustainable development or a “steady-state” economy (Daly, 1977).
The 1987 Brundtland Commission report, for example, articulated a vision for
“development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and
Development, 1987; Mazmanian & Kraft, 2009). More recently, the pursuit of sustainable
development, including transitions to less carbon- and resource-intensive economies, has
diffused into the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development via seventeen Sustainable
Development Goals, which integrate environmental criteria alongside poverty alleviation,
security, and gender equality related goals, previously central to the Millenium Development
Goals.
Concerns about environmental quality have often overlapped with broader concerns
about social justice and inequality. Less powerful actors, including Indigenous peoples, racial
and ethnic minorities, and economically disadvantaged communities, have historically
struggled to gain recognition of both existing and emergent environmental problems in their
backyards—from the siting of toxic waste sites and pipelines to the after-effects of hydraulic
fracturing on drinking water safety and even contamination by genetically modified
organisms (Taylor, 2014; Konisky, 2015; Bullard, 2018). These same actors have likewise
faced uphill battles to design and advance policy solutions that effectively redress these
problems. Even seemingly beneficent environmental policies can strip marginalized groups
of their property or usufruct rights to land use. For example, “fortress conservation” has been
critiqued for preserving hot spots of biodiversity or other unique wild places, like national
parks, at the expense of local and Indigenous peoples with historic claims to those places as
customary fishing, foraging, farming or herding grounds (Büscher, 2016). Nevertheless,
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despite power and resource asymmetries, otherwise disadvantaged groups or communities do
sometimes prevail in the policy process (Starobin, 2018).
Much social science research has focused on the factors that explain the rise of
modern environmental movements in many countries and the growing international
consensus that status quo environmental conditions are no longer acceptable (Andrews, 1999;
Guha, 2000; Coglianese, 2001; Schreuers, 2003). Like other policy problems, the framing of
environmental problems can vary across institutional, cultural, and political settings (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1983; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011;
Dryzek, 2013). This may especially be a particular concern when natural scientists have yet
to develop a research consensus on an issue or develop valid instruments to test otherwise
unobservable biological or chemical relationships. Furthermore, when policy entrepreneurs
have yet to to name the problem and seek solutions, adverse environmental conditions may
never reach the public policy agenda (Kingdon, 1984).
Once environmental policy issues have reached a place on the policy agenda, social
science research has contributed in important ways to the understanding of the sources of
environmental problems by governmental officials and policy analysts. We focus in this
section on social science understandings of the principal sources of environmental problems
understood as the negative byproducts of economic activity—pollution—and other
unintended consequences of that activity which pose risks to human health, loss of
environmental amenities, damage to ecosystems, or resource-based reductions in quality of
human life. How society can, and ought to, account for, prevent, or adapt to environmental
and natural resource damages becomes the core problem for environmental policy to solve.
We highlight here some of the most salient concepts that social scientists have contributed to
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the understanding of the sources of environmental problems which make up the foundation
for environmental policy analysis.
A. Externalities and Transaction Costs
Economists’ conceptualization of environmental problems as a form of market failure
has become widely accepted. Although markets in principle allocate goods and services
efficiently, market failures can arise when transactions do not accurately reflect the full value
of goods and services either to the parties to those transactions or to third parties who are
affected by them. Environmental problems take the form of a market failure known as
negative externalities—the imposition of harmful effects to third parties as a result of the
production or consumption of a good. These externalities, or spillovers, are not reflected in
the price of goods and services, and hence the relevant goods and services are oversupplied in
the market from the standpoint of society overall. If the price of coal, for example, fails to
reflect the full costs borne by society associated with its production, then coal would be, in
effect, artificially cheaper than it should be, leading more people to buy it than would be
desirable from the standpoint of overall social welfare. If the coal industry could be forced to
“internalize” these social costs, consumers would receive a more accurate price signal of the
total costs (private and societal) associated with coal—compelling them to make different
choices, such as using less coal or seeking out alternative energy technologies that may have
fewer externalities (such as wind and solar) and which would then be more cost-competitive.
At a micro-level, externalities can be understood by reference to economist Ronald
Coase’s well-known parable of a farmer and a rancher—a puzzle based on a conflict between
two neighbors that provides a metaphor and analytic framework for understanding negative
externalities (Coase, 1960). The Coase Theorem suggests that markets fail in the face of
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externalities largely due to the existence of transaction costs (Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999), for if
transaction costs did not exist, the relevant parties could achieve an efficient allocation of
resources (Coase, 1960; Ellickson, 1986). In Coase’s parable-world (without transaction
costs), the farmer and rancher would bargain between themselves to minimize the sum of
both the damages from cattle straying into the farmer’s crops and the costs of damage
avoidance, such as building a fence. In reality, of course, as Coase himself understood, there
do exist very real transaction costs associated with gathering information, negotiating
agreements, and resolving disputes over pollution and the use of natural resources. The
existence of these transaction costs means that many negative spillovers to market
transactions will occur because it is too costly for the affected parties—often many thousands
upon thousands of people, not just an individual farmer and rancher—to negotiate “win-win”
agreements.

B. Public Goods and Commons Problems

Environmental problems like pollution affect large numbers of people, although the
impact that any single polluting source has on any single individual within a large affected
population may only be quite modest, even if in the aggregate, across all affected individuals,
these adverse impacts are quite large. The asymmetry between the individual and collective
impact of many environmental harms gives rise to the well-known problem of collective
action (Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965). This problem arises when each individual member of an
affected group does not have enough at stake relative to the costs of avoiding the externality
(or of mobilizing pressure to have a polluting source move or invest in pollution control). It is
often rational under such circumstances for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others.
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Collective action problems derive from the fact that many environmental amenities are public
goods: that is, they are non-rivalrous (use by one person does not deplete from others) and
non-excludable (cannot be kept from those who do not contribute to or pay for them).
Environmental quality often possesses the characteristics of a public good; everyone can
breathe clean air without having paid for it.
Ecosystems and natural resources also often possess the characteristics of public
goods. Garrett Hardin (1968) showed how the public-goods nature of natural resources can
lead to what he called the “tragedy of the commons” (Feeny et al., 1990). When resources are
shared in common and are non-excludable, it is individually rational for all the users of the
resource to maximize their short-run gains from resource use and extraction—say, to graze as
many cattle as possible—which leads to crowding, over-use, and eventual degradation of
shared natural resources. Although all public goods problems involve issues related to goods
possessing the dual characteristics of being non-rivalrous and non-excludable, many
commons problems arise from the attributes of a common pool resource being nonexcludable but rival in consumption—meaning that use by one person makes that same
resource unavailable to another (or potentially diminishes the overall quality of the resource)
(Ostrom, 1990, 2008). Open ocean fisheries are a classic example of a common pool
resource; boats “race to fish” to catch as many fish as possible, and fish taken by one vessel
leave the fish stock depleted for subsequent fishing boats in the area, and it is challenging, if
not impossible, to exclude boats from fishing in open waters.
Still, some empirical social science research suggests that the “tragedy of the
commons” is not inevitable (McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990, 2008; Apostle et al.,
2002). Under certain conditions, people can interact with common pool resources or other
public goods in ways that counteract the tendency to free-ride, even absent governmental
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intervention. Such community-based self-regulation of local common pool resources can take
on a diversity of institutional forms, involving a blend of formal and informal rules and
customary norms—scaffolded by incentives and sanctions to elicit compliance—including
shaming, social exclusion, and excommunication. By and large, however, the broad decline
in environmental quality in many countries, along with the emergence of wicked
environmental problems such as climate change, tends to be consistent with the “tragedy of
the commons” account and the free-riding tendency of various social actors (individuals,
businesses, nations).
Natural science has shown how the decline of a single species or natural resource can
cause major damage to or changes in an ecosystem. When the population of a species that
makes up a fishery declines, for example, it may lead to a collapse not only of the species
itself but it may also create a threat to the entire ecosystem. The effects of scarcity on
ecosystems are sufficiently well established that natural scientists have at times forecasted
eventual global environmental collapse as many species and resources disappear (Ehrlich,
1968). By contrast with the natural science perspective which sees scarcity as an important
environmental problem, from the perspective of social sciences, particularly economics,
scarcity can actually increase the value of a good or service and may prompt efforts to
preserve it. This occurs with private goods (that is, goods that individuals can possess to the
exclusion of others) because scarcity makes them more valuable, assuming constant demand.
The increase in their value can, in turn, provide incentives for individuals to invest in new
ways to protect or expand the private resource or to make other technological innovations
(Simon, 1977).
Broadly, patterns of economic development have sometimes been seen to follow a
pattern of increased scarcity or other environmental degradation to be followed by subsequent

9

efforts at preservation. The Kuznets curve refers to a pattern showing that as economies
industrialize and achieve a peak in income and consumption growth, environmental pollution
actually begins to decrease, implying that economic growth might ultimately benefit the
environment (Kuznets, 1955; Fiorino, 2018a). Inglehart’s (1977) theory of post-materialism
reflects a similar pattern, as populations have historically mobilized environmental political
action after their basic material needs have been met. Despite these trends, “leapfrogging”
has also occurred in several developing economies, wherein economic actors will skip over
the use of polluting industrial technologies in favor of their more environmentally-friendly
counterparts. In this way, developing countries are often said to face the possibility of
“tunneling through” the environmental Kuznets curve by learning from the mistakes of the
wealthy, industrialized nations (Munasighe, 1999).
These kinds of dynamics, however, do not appear to occur without some kind of
governmental intervention to compel polluters to bear the costs of environmental
improvement. They especially do not apply in the same way to global public goods, where
international institutions are weaker. Climate change, for example, results from scarcity
occurring in terms of an atmosphere free of high levels of carbon dioxide, methane, and other
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Scarcity in this sense—that is, of a clean atmosphere—does not
automatically generate price signals or other market incentives to try to protect the planet
from warming. On the contrary, each actors’ principal incentives are to let someone else bear
the costs of reducing GHG emissions. Meaningful benefits of reductions in GHGs will only
accrue if many actors (individuals, companies, and countries) reduce their emissions. Each
actor might reasonably ask why it should incur extra costs of emissions reductions if others
are not also doing so. Furthermore, if others do in fact reduce emissions, the benefits from
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their reductions cannot be excluded from those actors who did not reduce. With public goods,
market signals by themselves cannot erase the incentive to free ride.

II. Policy Solutions

Whether environmental problems are understood in terms of the ill effects of pollution
and resource depletion, or in terms of the more recent emphasis on sustainability, it is clear
that they do not emerge in a vacuum. They manifest from the interaction of human activities
with the environment, often arising from very complex, dynamic systems involving the
interaction of economic and social behavior with the natural environment (Matson, Clark, &
Andersson, 2016). Individuals, groups, businesses, and states endeavor to extract value from
natural resources for a range of valuable purposes, but in the process they can degrade or
exhaust those resources.
Understanding these underlying causes of environmental problems suggests a general
approach to solving those problems.

When environmental problems are understood as

externalities of economic activity, then the general solution will lie in finding ways to ensure
that individuals and businesses internalize those externalities. Although this general solution
seems straightforward in concept, determining how best to motivate the internalization of
externalities raises challenging policy issues. We consider here the contributions of social
science to two main issues integral to environmental policy analysis: (1) the identification of
the policy criteria against which solutions should be chosen or assessed, and (2) the general
advantages and disadvantages of different environmental policy instruments.
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A. Criteria and values

A perennial question in environmental policy analysis is, “How safe is safe?” This
question arises most clearly in determining how stringent various limits on pollution should
be set in government regulations, but in a fundamental way it represents the core question
undergirding almost all important environmental policy decisions. It is a question without an
easy, uncontested answer, even though too often scholars and policymakers seem to treat
“safety” or “environmental protection” as if they are self-evident concepts or ones that can be
determined simply by marshaling forth scientific evidence.
This tendency has manifested itself in recent years in scholars’ and policymakers’
advocacy of a “risk-based” approach to regulation (Bounds, 2010; Wiener, 2010; Black,
2008), with the implication being that policy decisions can automatically follow from a clear
and rigorous scientific understanding of effects on human health or ecological viability. But
natural science by itself cannot determine how (or how stringently) environmental policy
should be made, as policy determinations call for making normative judgments in addition to
gathering scientific information (Coglianese & Marchant, 2004). To be coherent, any riskbased approach to environmental regulation needs to be grounded in a clear articulation of
normative values or policy criteria (Paoli & Wiles, 2015; Rothstein et al., 2006; Finkel &
Golding, 1995). Principled environmental decision-making depends on choices about how
much pollution should be deemed acceptable—or, more generally, by what criteria should
environmental policy decisions be guided.
A variety of potential criteria can be discerned throughout the policy-analytic social
science literature, although any thorough consideration of them will require some exploration
of moral or political philosophy. For present purposes, we begin with a key criterion from
12

standard welfare economics—namely, efficiency—and then proceed to discuss costeffectiveness and feasibility as two major alternatives to efficiency. We then discuss equity as
another vital criterion not captured by efficiency or cost-effectiveness, and perhaps even in
tension with such economic criteria (Okun 1975).
Efficiency takes into account not only the benefits of environmental policy in terms of
reductions in harm, but it also factors in and seeks to balance those benefits with the costs of
achieving them. It does so in two ways. The first way follows the concept of Pareto
efficiency, which demands that a policy make at least some individual better off but without
making any individual worse off. It has sometimes been hypothesized that Pareto efficiency
can be achieved with respect to environmental policy through supposed “win-win” options
that deliver improvements in the environment as well as cost-savings or other private returns
to businesses (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). But empirical evidence suggests that such winwin opportunities are relatively rare and, in any case, cannot achieve anything close to the
full internalization of all negative externalities (Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995).
The second, and more commonly accepted, test of efficiency is known as KaldorHicks efficiency. Under this test, more than just literal win-win options can be efficient. The
Kaldor-Hicks test also accepts as efficient any option where the “winners” under a policy
(say, those whose water source becomes cleaner) benefit in the aggregate in an amount
greater than the costs the policy will impose on the “losers” (say, those businesses that must
pay to install equipment to reduce their water pollution). This test calls for the estimation of
net benefits, which is what is usually applied in benefit-cost analyses of environmental
policies (Gramlich, 1990).
The application of an efficiency test, though, raises a host of analytical and
methodological challenges. One initial challenge involves identifying and characterizing the
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underlying risks to be addressed. The enterprise of risk assessment has been largely driven by
natural sciences, but not exclusively so (Stern & Fineberg, 1996; Jasanoff, 1987). It is also an
enterprise that is crucial even when relying on policy criteria other than efficiency.
But when an efficiency test applies, any expected reduction in risks from different
policy alternatives must be valued or monetized, either by revealed-preference methods (e.g.,
extrapolating from how labor markets offer a wage premium for riskier jobs) (Cropper et al.,
2011; Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) or by stated-preference or contingent valuation
methods (e.g., relying on social-science surveys to estimate individuals’ willingness-to-pay
for improvements in environmental conditions) (Carson et al., 1992; Covello & Mumpower,
1985). Often environmental policies deliver their risk reduction benefits years or decades into
the future—something that is especially the case for policies that aim to reduce cancercausing pollutants, as their effects can have long latency periods. In such instances, the
monetized estimates of all policy impacts will be converted into present value terms, raising
the need to identify an appropriate discount rate to use in converting estimates to presentvalue terms (Revesz, 1999).
The efficiency test—and the resulting use of benefit-cost analysis to determine
whether that test is met—has also raised normative critiques and questions which hold
implications either more narrowly for various methodological choices or more broadly about
whether to use benefit-cost analysis at all (Bronsteen et al., 2013; Adler & Posner 2006;
Ackerman & Heinzerling, 2005; Kelman, 1981). Some of these questions center on how to
value a policy’s impacts on future generations (Arrow et al., 2013; Brown Weiss, 1990) or on
individuals from countries other than those of the policymaker (Rowell & Wexler, 2014).
Others ask how to value impacts on natural resources that go beyond “use value” to humans,
such as whether and how to incorporate “non-use” or “existence” value (e.g., the value of just
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knowing that certain wilderness areas are protected, even if never planning to travel to them)
(Mendelsohn & Olmstead, 2009). In some societies, indigenous or aboriginal cultures view
these valuation choices—as well as more fundamental epistemological assumptions—in ways
different from members of industrialized cultures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Berkes et al.,
2006; Bohensky & Maru, 2011). Even within industrialized cultures, significant differences
can exist in how lay people and experts view different risks (Slovic et al., 1981; Wynne,
1996).
These normative and methodological issues arise principally when the efficiency
criterion is applied to environmental policy decisions. By and large, other applicable policy
criteria will dispense with the need to make the valuation judgments involved when benefits
must be monetized, as the efficiency test demands. One alternative along these lines is the
criterion of cost-effectiveness, which also accounts for the costs of a policy but does not call
for balancing those costs against benefits, and thus does not necessitate any attempt to
monetize benefits such as avoided mortality or morbidity or environmental amenities. The
cost-effectiveness criterion would point decision-makers toward policies that can achieve the
desired level of environmental or health improvement at the lowest cost.
Others have proposed using feasibility as a policy criterion, seeking to maximize
environmental protection within the constraint of what is feasible (Driesen, 2005; but see
Masur & Posner, 2010). The feasibility criterion is a close cousin to the precautionary
principle, which has been widely urged as the better way to make policy decisions about
environmental risk (Freestone & Hey, 1996). In general, the precautionary principle shifts the
burden of proof on those who create potential externalities—for example, those who create
new products or processes that could harm the environment or human health. It forbids
economic activities until they can be shown to impose no externalities. Although the
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precautionary principle possesses considerable appeal to policymakers and members of the
public, some scholars have questioned its coherence and wisdom (Sunstein, 2005).
Whether the criterion selected for a particular policy analysis might be efficiency, costeffectiveness, or feasibility, policy analysis often focuses just on the aggregate effects of
environmental policies—that is, on their overall benefits or costs—not on how those effects
are distributed (Robinson, Hammitt, & Zeckhauser, 2016). From the standpoint of welfare
economics, the principal concern with market failures lies with the overall social costs of
economic activity; when externalities exist, pollution becomes over-produced (or natural
resources become over-exploited). But environmental problems also raise critical
distributional fairness concerns as well. The scarcity that underlies most environmental
problems necessarily implicates what Young (2013) calls a “problem of allocation.” This
problem is one concerning “who gets what rather than a matter of sustainability or the
avoidance of negative side effects” (Young, 2013:12).
Equity issues are embedded in environmental problems themselves because the risks
and environmental harms from economic activity are not equally borne by everyone in
society (Adler, 2012). Especially palpable in this regard are socioeconomic and racial
disparities in the imposition of the harms from industrial activity, concerns that have been
reflected in an “environmental justice” movement in the United States and elsewhere (Cole &
Foster, 2001).
Equity issues also are fundamentally embedded in choices about policy solutions. The
Coasean parable, for example, not only illustrates what a negative externality is, but it also
reveals equity’s centrality in how rights get distributed whenever establishing policies or
setting up legal regimes. Given the presence of transaction costs, it matters whether farmers
are given the right to exclude others from their farmfields or ranchers are given the right to
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allow their cattle to roam freely. Which is the fair distribution? This question arises not just
in parables but in the real world of policy decision-making whenever choices must be made
between policy options that will reap benefits to some people and impose costs on still others.
It also arises whenever tradeable emissions permit systems are established, as policymakers
must decide to whom and in what proportion to award the initial allocation of permits
(Young, 2013).
Attentiveness to distributional fairness raises several other environmental policy issues
as well. One of these centers on how tradeoffs between efficiency and equity ought to be
resolved (Okun, 1975; Adler, 2012). Another concerns the extent to which benefits accruing
to residents in foreign countries should be factored into the policy calculus, a particularly
salient issue in the context of global climate change policy (Gayer & Viscusi, 2016). Still
another issue focuses on the moral obligations that present-day individuals and businesses
owe to future generations, an issue also implicated by climate change (Brown Weiss, 1989).
Considerations of equity and fairness over environmental quality bear some affinity
with the view that environmental protection is a human right. Even though rights-based
thinking may seldom explicitly factor into formal policy analyses of environmental problems
in many developed economies, such a view does seem to permeate much political and legal
discourse over environmental policy. Any such right may be invoked or framed at the level of
the individual or at the level of a community, such as in the latter case when indigenous
peoples suffer targeted environmental degradation (Boyle, 2006; Shelton, 1991). As noted
previously, some observers have also suggested that ecosystems or species themselves
possess intrinsic value, if not rights, even when humans incur no instrumental harm (Naess,
1973; Sagoff, 1988; Stone 2010). Others ask whether a human right to environmental quality
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comes into tension with other human rights or with a commitment to democratic governance
(Ophuls, 1977; Bartley, 2018; Fiorino, 2018b).

B. Policy Instruments

The principal policy criteria we have highlighted—especially efficiency, costeffectiveness, feasibility, and equity—are commonly used in policy analysis to inform
decisions about a variety of possible policy responses to environmental problems. In this
section, we briefly review the key findings from social science research on the major tools
available to the environmental policy maker (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering &
Medicine, 2018; Richards, 2000). All of the tools discussed here have been adopted and
implemented by national governmental bodies, so for our present purposes we will treat such
bodies as the key policy-makers, even though most of the instruments discussed here could
be applied by other decision-makers, whether private or public, international or local.
As these various policy tools have been adopted in practice, social science researchers
have sought to understand the conditions under which each may be best implemented and the
extent to which each proves effective in addressing environmental problems and meeting
relevant policy criteria (Richards, 2000). A distillation of this research suggests that decisionmakers do well to consider three principal factors when deciding which tool to use: the nature
of the environmental problem, characteristics of the industry actors or other sources of that
problem, and the capacity of governmentl institutions to implement and enforce the tool
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2018). Generally speaking, the
more flexible the regulatory tool, the more likely it will produce outcomes that are more
efficient or cost-effective. However, if that flexibility is not accompanied by a sufficient set
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of incentives for businesses to improve their environmental performance—either from market
pressures or through effective compliance monitoring and enforcement—environmental
policy might not prove effective at all (Bennear and Coglianese, 2013; Kamieniecki & Kraft,
2013).
We discuss the tools below roughly in the order with which they have emerged in
response to environmental problems in many countries, with interest in more flexible
strategies seeming to grow over time (Press, 2007). In many countries, the initial response to
environmental problems tended to focus mainly on liability followed by the imposition of
“command and control” standards, such as means-based and performance-based regulation
(Andrews, 1999). Concerns about the bluntness and costs of these approaches eventually led
to interest in more flexible regulatory designs, such as market-based policy instruments and
management-based regulation (Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, 1998; Bennear and Coglianese,
2013; Rabe, 2018a). Policymakers and scholars have also focused attention on voluntary
programs established to encourage firms to go beyond compliance with environmental rules
(Fiorino, 2006; Auld, Bernstein, & Cashore, 2008; Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Durant,
Fiorino, & O’Leary, 2017). Today, all of these tools are deployed to varying degrees by most
governments around the world.

1. Ex-post liability

One tool for addressing environmental problems is to impose liability on polluters after
they cause harm to others. Sometimes referred to as the “polluter pays” principle, ex-post
liability can, at least in theory, provide a deterrent effect that leads polluters to adopt
preventative measures. Although ex-post liability may be deemed appropriate for special
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types of environmental concerns or as a general backstop to other options, such liability by
itself is generally thought to be insufficient as a principal means of addressing environmental
concerns, mainly for the very same kinds of reasons that environmental problems arise in the
first place: transaction costs and the problems of collective action (Bardach & Kagan, 1982).
Even with liability, harmed individuals will have an incentive to free ride on others, rather
than seek their own costly forms of redress through a liability regime. This dynamic
presumably leads to a less-than-optimal level of deterrence—and the continued existence of
the very environmental problems policymakers seek to solve. To overcome the shortcomings
in ex-post liability, and in an effort to try to prevent environmental harms from occurring in
the first place, governments have adopted protective, proactive environmental regulation.

2. Means-based regulation

Proactive regulation can take a variety of forms. One form consists of rules directing
regulated entities (e.g., businesses) to use a particular means of pollution control or to take
other specified action to reduce environmental problems. Sometimes characterized as
technology or specification standards, examples of these “means standards” include
requirements for the installation of catalytic converters on automobiles or the operation of
emissions scrubbers on factory smokestacks. This type of regulation is not uncommon in
environmental policy. Means standards generally offer greater certainty that regulated firms
will take the desired environmentally protective action, and they may also be easier than
other types of regulation for regulatory officials to enforce (National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering & Medicine, 2018). Despite these advantages, means standards will often be less
cost-effective than other forms of regulation because they mandate the same, “one-size-fits-
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all” action for every regulated firm. Some firms may not really need to take the required
action, or they may have available to them other actions that would prove more effective or
less costly.

3. Performance-based regulation

Instead of mandating means, regulation can also mandate the attainment or avoidance
of certain outcomes—setting a goal of “what” to achieve but not specifying “how” to achieve
it. Such a performance standard does not require the use of any particular technology or other
action; on the contrary, it leaves the means of achieving or avoiding the required outcome up
to the regulated firm. All that firms must do is deliver on the outcome (Coglianese, Nash, &
Olmstead, 2003; May, 2011). An emissions limit is a common example of a performance
standard.
By specifying requirements in terms of outcomes and giving firms flexibility in
meeting those outcomes, performance standards can overcome the one-size-fits-all
disadvantage of means standards (May, 2003). Performance standards can also better allow
for innovation to occur (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2004). For these reasons, many social
scientists have recommended performance standards as more cost-effective regulatory
instruments.
Yet performance standards are not without their disadvantages either. As a fundamental
matter, performance standards need a reliable method for measuring firms’ satisfaction of the
required outcome conditions. Yet sometimes measurement of outcomes can be difficult with
respect to environmental standards. As a practical matter, regulators typically cannot monitor
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on an ongoing basis the emissions from every smokestack and exhaust pipe that contributes
pollution to the air.
Furthermore, performance standards can be susceptible to a type of gaming known as
“teaching to the test,” which occurs when regulated firms find ways to meet the required
outcome but in ways that work to the detriment of the larger purpose of the regulation. An
example can be found in the 2015 Volkswagen’s diesel scandal; the company had installed
software that ensured their engines optimized for emissions control while connected to the
required testing machine, but then recalibrated and spewed out more pollution when
operating under normal, on-the-road conditions (Coglianese, 2017). Performance standards
may also be somewhat more prone to the incidence of unintended consequences as firms use
their flexibility in creative ways that produce new, unanticipated problems (May, 2003).

4. Market Instruments

Although performance standards prove more cost-effective than means standards, they
still can be less cost-effective than so-called market-based regulatory instruments. This is
because performance standards can suffer from their own type of one-size-fits-all problem:
they require uniform levels of emissions control even when the marginal costs for controlling
those emissions can vary across different firms. Rather than demanding every firm meet the
same emissions limit, market instruments allow for – and even provide incentives for – firms
to choose their own level of emissions. Market instruments operate either by setting a perunit tax on emissions or by establishing a system of tradable emissions permits (Tietenberg,
1985).
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A marginal pollution tax set at the level equal to the social costs of pollution would
solve the Coasian bargaining problem discussed in section 1.A above and would ensure that
firms fully internalize their externalities (Pigou, 1932). However, the precise marginal social
cost of pollution can be difficult to determine, and while a tax provides certainty in terms of
costs imposed on firms, it does not provide much certainty about the overall level of pollution
that will be reduced.
An alternative market-based approach called emissions trading—or simply “cap and
trade”—can provide greater certainty about the overall level of pollution reductions. Under a
cap and trade system, an overall desired level of emissions is established and a number of
aggregate emissions “credits” issued that total the desired level. Each individual firm then
receives credits equaling a portion of the overall emissions level; they must keep their
emissions below the amount allowed by the permits they possess—much like with any
performance standard. But unlike with uniform performance standards, firms can exchange
credits under cap and trade, thus varying the level of control each firm must achieve. Those
firms with lower marginal costs of control can free up some of their emissions credits by
reducing pollution more than required and then sell excess credits to other firms with higher
marginal costs of control, ultimately achieving the same overall level of pollution reductions
but at a lower cost. These theoretical expectations of greater cost-effectiveness have been
confirmed by empirical research (Cropper & Oates, 1992; Stavins, 2007).
Market instruments are, of course, susceptible to some of the same potential
limitations as performance standards. They very much depend, for instance, on a reliable
means of measuring emissions. Moreover, market-based environmental policy instruments
may lead to another particular problem: hot spots. If those firms that buy credits and those
that sell credits are located in different areas, pollution levels could become more
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concentrated in some regions. Research has also investigated whether cap and trade tends to
disadvantage smaller firms (Newell & Rogers, 2003).

5. Management-based regulation

Management-based regulation does not require firms meet a specific targeted outcome
nor even adopt any direct means that aim toward a desired outcome, but instead it mandates
that firms collect information, develop internal plans and procedures, and engage in other
management-related actions that aim indirectly toward reducing environmental problems
(Bennear, 2006; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). For example, some laws direct companies using
toxic chemicals to engage in pollution prevention planning to try to reduce their use of toxics,
even without requiring those companies take any specific pollution prevention or control
measures—or sometimes without even demanding that they carry out their required plans. In
short, management-based regulation aims to solve environmental problems by spurring
improvements in private-sector environmental management (Coglianese & Nash, 2006).
Management-based regulations appear to be suitable when addressing environmental
problems where one-size-fits-all means do not exist and where monitoring outcomes is not
feasible. It has been used, for example, to encourage reductions in the use of toxic chemicals
and to try to prevent catastrophic industrial accidents. Empirical evidence shows that these
regulations can lead to improvements in some measures of environmental quality (Bennear,
2006, 2007; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). However, research also suggests that improvements
induced by management-based regulations may not be long-lived. Firms appear initially to
find low-hanging fruit once they start to manage their environmental affairs more self-
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consciously in response to management-based requirements, but over time the required
planning appears to become more routinized and environmental improvements taper off.

6. Information disclosure

Another regulatory approach requires not just the gathering of information for internal
planning purposes, but the affirmative public disclosure of certain kinds of information
(Sunstein, 1999; Tietenberg, 1998). The U.S. Toxics Releases Inventory (TRI) regulation
serves as a prominent example of this policy instrument. TRI requires certain industrial
facilities to disclose to the public the volume of toxic chemicals they release into the
environment. Some researchers have attributed the decline over time in chemicals reported
under TRI as a sign of the policy’s success (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Fung & O'Rourke,
2000). Others have shown that observed reductions can be explained instead by other, more
traditional forms of regulation operating in the background or by factors other than real
improvements in environmental performance (Poje & Horowitz, 1990; Natan & Miller, 1998;
de Marchi & Hamilton, 2006; Bennear, 2008). Indeed, some empirical research suggests that
the impact of toxics disclosure requirements might even depend on their combination with
strong conventional environmental regulations and pressures from environmental groups
(Kraft, Stephan, & Abel, 2011).
Studies of state programs in the United States that promote the disclosure of toxic
emissions information have failed to find evidence that disclosure has produced any
significant effects on facilities’ environmental performance (Grant & Jones, 2004; Kraft,
Stephan, & Abel, 2011). The precise effects, if any, of the federal TRI law remain unknown
(Hamilton, 2005). That said, other research has shown that in other settings information
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disclosure can sometimes contribute to at least some modest levels of environmental
improvement (Bennear & Olmstead, 2008). Researchers theorize that information disclosure
can reinforce various other legal, market, and social pressures for companies to reduce
pollution (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998; Konar & Cohen, 1997).
Furthermore, if the aphorism that “what gets measured, gets managed” rings true, then
information disclosure may also operate as a partial form of management-based regulation
and induce spillover managerial changes at regulated firms (Karkkainen, 2001).

7. Subsidies

The public goods nature of environmental quality can impede private financing for
certain kinds of environmental solutions, such as water supply systems or storm-water
management. Public financing and subsidies can fill in gaps in private financing of public
environmental amenities. Tax credits for investments in nonrenewable sources of energy are
another example of a type of subsidy available to address environmental problems.

8. Voluntary programs

A related approach is to reward firms that voluntarily adopt environmentally
responsible actions or achieve high levels of environmental performance. Through so-called
voluntary environmental programs, governments sometimes offer qualifying firms technical
assistance, awards and public recognition, special eco-labels, or specified forms of regulatory
relief. Examples include the U.S. government’s “Energy Star” product labeling program or
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Environmental Performance Track
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partnership program (Coglianese & Nash, 2014). Some research shows that these kinds of
voluntary programs can have a discernible effect on certain environmentally relevant metrics
(Pizer, Morgenstern, & Shih, 2010; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007), but because the rewards
offered firms through these programs are typically modest, they are likely to have only
limited value for solving most major environmental problems (Coglianese & Nash, 2014).

III. Institutions

Just as social science research has helped identify and evaluate different policy
instruments for addressing environmental problems, it has also clarified several key
institutional choices relevant to environmental policy. These include choices about the types
of institutions that should bear the primary responsibility for addressing environmental
problems—specifically, the public or private sector—as well as about the appropriate scale of
policy responses—top-down or bottom-up. In addition, social science research about policy
decision-making has made contributions to the design of processes used to make and
implement environmental policy.

A. Public vs. private

Although governments are major sources of environmental policy, a variety of nongovernmental actors also fulfill governance roles (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Vandenbergh &
Gilligan, 2017). Especially in societies lacking in state capacity or for problems that
governments are unable or unwilling to address, private third parties can serve as surrogates
for (or at times supplements to) governmental actors (Büthe, 2010). Sometimes called
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“private regulators,” business associations or NGOs operating in this capacity derive their
authority and legitimacy more through moral persuasion and market power than coercion or
force (Green, 2013; Cashore et al., 2004). For example, a variety of privately created labeling
and certification schemes have emerged to provide global consumers and businesses credible
information and assurances related to niche preferences for more sustainable or ethical forms
of agriculture and manufacturing (Starobin & Weinthal, 2010). These non-state schemes can
impose means or performance standards—or any of the types of rules that governments could
impose—but they lack the ability to mandate compliance with the threat of state-imposed
sanctions. As a result, private forms of environmental governance will bear many similarities
to voluntary programs adopted by governments. That said, the market pressures available to
business associations, NGOs, and even multinational corporations like Wal-Mart can
sometimes create incentives for compliance that rival those provided by state authority
(Starobin, 2013).
Social scientists have investigated why firms willingly undertake to “self-regulate” and
voluntarily go beyond bare compliance with the law. Conventional wisdom holds that private
certification schemes offer firms a club good—exclusive reputational benefits available only
to those members that achieve the desired level of compliance—thereby distinguishing
leaders from laggard competitors in their sector (Prakash & Potoski, 2006). Other incentives
for self-regulation include product differentiation, access to markets, and, in some cases, a
reduction in the probability of eventual governmental regulation. Researchers have sought to
evaluate private forms of environmental governance and on occasion have found that they
generate improvements in certain metrics, such as days in compliance with regulations and
paperwork processing (Prakash & Potoski, 2006). As with voluntary programs more
generally, it has been harder for researchers to find substantively significant improvements
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associated with these private voluntary efforts. Concerns exist about the adequacy of
implementation of and compliance monitoring associated with non-state forms of
environmental governance.
In reality, the choice between private and public governance is seldom truly binary.
Instead the public and private sectors are intertwined in environmental governance (Steinberg
& VanDeveer, 2012). The shadow of public governance, such as through regulatory threats,
shapes what otherwise seems to be voluntary private action (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004). In turn,
though, public governance depends vitally on private firms for information and action
(Coglianese, 2007). Research reveals an intertwined public-private governance, especially in
transnational business governance interactions, with multiple actors across sectors and
countries collaborating in the creation of private regulations while cooperating within
existing state regulatory structures (Eberlein et al., 2014; Levi-Faur & Starobin, 2014;
Bartley, 2011, 2018). The choice for environmental policy often is a matter of emphasis on
one sector over the other, or in allocating different roles and responsibilities to actors from
each sector.

B. Top-down vs. bottom-up

A perennial issue in environmental policy concerns the scale at which solutions should
be sought (Young, 2002). With the exception of problems with highly localized impacts,
environmental problems often transcend political boundaries, raising the question of whether
the responsibility for addressing them should be assumed by national bodies or devolved to
lower levels of scale. The choice between a top-down versus a bottom-up set of solutions
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assumes particular significance for transnational environmental problems, such as climate
change.
Countries have long relied on international treaties as core policy tools employed to
elicit compliance from states to provide global public goods, prevent environmental harms,
and protect human rights (O’Neill, 2009; Mitchell, 2003; Susskind, 1994). Yet, in the era of
globalization, both states and non-state actors, including businesses, perform nuanced roles
that go beyond treaty formation, negotiation, and ratification—and often they must consider
whether other, bottom-up policy tools, including private, voluntary initiatives or other
innovative policy alternatives, might prove more effective (Andrews et al, 2017; Starobin,
2018).
Top-down approaches to governing the global environment like multilateral treaties
have long been the classic approach to tackling the collective action challenges associated
with managing commons at the international scale—seeking to impose on countries a regime
under which they make specific commitments (e.g., on ozone depletion, greenhouse gas
reductions) related to ameliorating or preventing environmental damages if not also
contributing funds toward their remedy, even in other jurisdictions. Yet, these approaches
have also struggled at times with issues of effectiveness and inclusivity (Young, 1999; Haas
et al., 1993.). Treaties require ratification at the level of the nation-state to become
“binding”—even though they still rely upon signatories for enforcement, ultimately
depending on the willingness and capability of state-level bureaucracies to integrate
international ideas, norms, and institutions with domestic ones (DeSombre, 2000).
Top-down approaches have not only generated concerns about their effectiveness but
also about global equity, as top-down treaties may reflect the preferences of the developed
countries whose industrialization and development have fueled accelerated environmental
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degradation, to the exclusion of developing and emerging economies, many of which stand to
face more of the negative consequences like rising temperatures, sea level rise, and resource
scarcity (Escobar, 2011; Baland & Platteau, 1996.). In addition to developing countries
feeling left behind, affected individuals and communities—those at the bottom of the global
economic pyramid who are likely to experience environmental harms most directly—may not
have their interests and concerns reflected very well in top-down policy discussions.
Although bottom-up approaches to environmental governance may ameliorate
disadvantages of top-down approaches, when problems transcend a smaller scale, a bottomup approach may simply not be up to the task (Keohane & Ostrom, 1994). Furthermore, when
governance is devolved to lower scales, a concern arises for a “race-to-the-bottom” effect, as
local jurisdictions may have an incentive to compete for business activity through less
stringent policy measures. A related concern is that jurisdictional or scale spillovers may
occur; that is, as some localities or regions respond to environmental problems more
aggressively, they may only find that they push more-polluting businesses to other
jurisdictions with weaker policies, without fully solving the trans-boundary environmental
problem (Wiener, 2007). The extent to which these problems with bottom-up approaches
manifest themselves, however, remains an open question, with some research offering
counterexamples and theoretical reasons to question the significance of race-to-the-bottom
effects (Vogel, 2009; Revesz, 1992).
Although multilateral action by nations is an important component of global
environmental governance, there is much being done to address climate change across
varying levels of government. Transnational climate governance initiatives have emerged all
over the world, made up of governments of all sizes and locations—including cities, states,
countries, and regions—that are collaborating in nuanced ways to govern climate change
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(Rabe, 2004; Hoffmann, 2011; Green, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Andonova, Hale, &
Roger, 2017; Roger, Hale, & Andonova, 2017; Rabe, 2018b). An important issue is the
extent to which these various bottom-up approaches can substitute for top-down strategies as
well as how policies developed at different scales can be coordinated or integrated.

C. Policy Processes

Choices about policy criteria, instruments, and institutions all implicate values and
interests over which different individuals have different preferences and views.
Understanding how these choices should be made, and who makes them, has motivated the
vast field of political science across all policy domeans, including environmental policy (Vig
& Kraft, 2018). Relevant issues for environmental policy analysis include accountability and
transparency of policy decision-making and the type and extent of participation by affected
parties, including the broader public, in the decision-making process. With environmental
policy, democratic values are implicated in important, sometimes distinctive, ways, often
because the key institutions lack traditional electoral accountability connections. At the level
of domestic governance, for example, many pivotal institutions can be bureaucratic and
technical in orientation—and not directly accountable through elections but through oversight
by other electorally-based institutions. As a result, particularly relevant social science
research has focused on the role of experts (Haas, 1992; Jasanoff, 2009), consensus-building
in the administrative context (Coglianese, 2003) and public participation in decisions by
regulatory bodies (Singleton, 2000; Fraser et al., 2006; Tyler & Markell, 2008). In addition,
courts play consequential roles in shaping environmental policy at the domestic level and
their role vis-à-vis other governmental institutions has not escaped attention (Melnick, 1983;
Rose-Ackerman, 1995).
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At the level of global environmental governance, what it means to secure democratic
accountability creates further complications because typical electoral mechanisms do not
exist and direct participation by members of the public is practically difficult to accommodate
(Keohane, 2001; Cohen & Sabel, 2005). Accountability arises as an issue not only for the
design of international legal institutions, such as multilateral treaties, but also for voluntary
transnational initiatives, such as international environmental management standards or
certification programs for sustainable forestry practices. Policy decision-making in these
global settings tends to be fragmented and diffuse, with multiple interests at stake and
networks of public and private actors interacting in a variety of policy venues (Slaughter,
2005). Efforts to address the global accountability deficit can take the form of delegation
strategies that strengthen principal-agent relationships between state representatives and
global institutions or strategies of so-called stakeholder participation involving diverse
governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the global policy process (Grant and
Keohane, 2005). Accountability strategies can also be both internally and externally
oriented—the former comprising standards that in effect govern participants in the
transnational regime, and the latter involving efforts to build broader support for the regime
from those outside of it but who are nevertheless affected by it (Keohane, 2003; Gulbrandsen
& Auld, 2019). Research has suggested that information disclosure—one of the substantive
tools for addressing environmental problems—may be deployed to promote accountability in
global governance regimes (Büthe, 2012; Kelley & Simmons, 2019). However, it should be
noted that increased accountability may not always lead to improvements in environmental
performance, especially if the accountability mechanism leads a global institution to take a
lowest-common-denominator path (Park & Kramarz, 2019).
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Similar approaches to promoting accountability and legitimacy of environmental
institutions, both domestic and international, can be applied to environmental policy analysis
itself. Analysis will have greater impact on actual decisions when it is viewed as more
credible. Taking steps to involve others in participation in the generation of policy analysis
not only can enhance the information base on which analysts conduct their work but can also
make the findings of the analysis more broadly salient and trusted (Mitchell, Clark & Cash,
2006; Matson, Clark, & Andersson, 2016).
Finally, process choices emerge even after the analysis of and decision-making about
environmental policy tools. How policy tools are implemented can prove as vital as how they
are designed. Policies as they appear “on the books” do not always mirror how they are
applied at the “street level” (Kaufman. 1967; Pressman and Wildavsky. 1984; Lipsky. 2010).
Social science research has also contributed in important ways to the understanding of how
policy tools are implemented and enforced (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; Ayres
& Braithwaite, 1995).
Ultimately, the processes by which policy decisions are both made and implemented
provide the methods by which societies will solve environmental problems. The social
sciences have made important contributions to understanding how such processes work and
how they might be structured to generate improved environmental outcomes.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have endeavored to illuminate some of the many intellectual
contributions from social sciences to the understanding of environmental problems and to the
design of effective policy solutions that will change individual and collective behavior in
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ways that enhance environmental quality. We take as given the role for the natural sciences
in addressing environmental problems, as designing effective solutions depends on
understanding risks and their causes. Reliable natural science research is a necessary
foundation for developing policies to address environmental problems. Yet it is also not
sufficient. To generate sound environmental policy decisions, governments, businesses, and
global civil society actors also need social science research. Environmental problems and
their solutions both involve human behavior, and they implicate key normative or policy
questions that policy decision-makers must confront. Effective environmental policy
analysis, in other words, must be interdisciplinary (Mattor et al.. 2014). It must be grounded
in research from the natural sciences as well as in the careful consideration of theories,
concepts, and findings from the social sciences.
The underlying causes of environmental problems can be conceptualized in relatively
straightforward terms as a failure of individual actors to internalize externalities, but given
the sheer number of actors, and the variety of activities they engage in, effectuating a
meaningful internalization of environmental costs will often prove challenging and complex.
Devising effective solutions requires a nuanced understanding of the complex economic and
social sources of human-induced problems, as well as sources of countervailing pressure
because, most often, environmental harm occurs from people acting in ways that are privately
rational but collectively suboptimal. Those individuals and businesses currently imposing
spillovers on others can be expected to resist efforts that would force them to internalize
those costs, and if they generally possess greater resources or are better organized than
environmental cost-bearers, the distribution of environmental amenities may tend to mirror
that of other resources.
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An awareness that environmental harms are not evenly distributed, whether in
individual societies or around the world, reinforces the relevance of finding ways to ensure a
more complete elaboration of environmental policy’s impacts and a search for still better
ways improving the well-being of all members of society. Social science’s longstanding
interest in collective decision-making not only illuminates the causes of environmental
problems but helps identify the tools and processes needed to solve them more optimally and
fairly.
In the future, social science research will continue to be needed to explore
environmental problems, solutions, and institutions. Additional research can help refine and
improve each of the concepts and theories presented in this paper. Policy analysis could
benefit, for example, from still more refined work on the comparative performance of
different policy tools and the conditions for their success. In addition, as social and economic
conditions are in constant flux—as exemplified recently by the emergence of populism and
nationalism on multiple continents—these changing conditions will need to be studied for
their implications for analyzing environmental policy.
Changing natural conditions will also prompt the need for additional social science
research. It will also foster the need for research that more fully integrates the natural
sciences with the social sciences. For example, as climate change further strains liveability
conditions in many parts of the world—such as due to water shortages or the ravages of
floods and storms—social conflicts can be expected to be exacerbated. Under such
conditions, societies are likely to face the need for policy tools that not merely seek to
prevent or mitigate environmental problems but to adapt to them. Such tools could include
those needed to manage the relocation of entire communities, undertakings that will depend
on integrative research if they are to be executed effectively. As changing environmental
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conditions place societies under stress, the need for rigrous social science research as part of
environmental policy analysis will not disappear.

References

Ackerman, F., & Heinzerling, L. (2005). Priceless: On knowing the price of everything and
the value of nothing. New York: The New Press.
Adler, M.D., & Posner, E.A. (2006). New foundations of cost-benefit analysis. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Adler, M. D. (2012). Well-being and fair distribution: Beyond cost-benefit analysis. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Andonova, L.B., Hale, T.N. and Roger, C.B. (2017). National policy and transnational
governance of climate change: Substitutes or complements? International Studies
Quarterly, 61(2), pp.253-268.
Andrews, R.N. (1999). Managing the environment, managing ourselves: A history of
American environmental policy. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Andrews, R.N., Kraft, M.E., Bäckstrand, K., Layzer, J.A., Schulman, A., Langhelle, O.,
Haila, Y., Baehler, K., Stripple, J. and Vergragt, P.J. (2017). Conceptual innovation in
environmental policy. MIT Press.
Apostle, R., McCay, B., & Mikalsen, K.H. (2002). Enclosing the commons: Individual
transferable quotas in the Nova Scotia fishery. St. John’s, Newfoundland: Institute of
Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
Arrow, K.J., Cropper, M., Gollier, C., Groom, B., Heal, G.M., Newell, R.G., Nordhaus,
W.D., Pindyck, R.S., Pizer, W.A., Portney, P., & Sterner, T. (2013). How should

37

benefits and costs be discounted in an intergenerational context? The views of an
expert panel. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 12-53.
Attfield, R. (2014). Environmental ethics: An overview for the twenty-first century, 2nd ed.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Auld, G., Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2008). The new corporate social responsibility.
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 33: 413-435.
Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1995). Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation
debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baland, J.M., & Platteau, J.P. (1996). Halting degradation of natural resources: Is there a
role for rural communities? Rome, Italy: Food & Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations.
Bardach, E., & Kagan, R.A. (1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory
unreasonableness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Bardach, E., & Patashnik, E. M. (2015). A practical guide for policy analysis: The eightfold
path to more effective problem solving. CQ press.
Bartley, T. (2011). Transnational governance as the layering of rules: Intersections of public
and private standards. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 12(2), pp. 517-542.
Bartley, T. (2018). Rules without rights: Land, labor, and private authority in the global
economy. Oxford University Press.
Bennear, L.S. (2006). Evaluating management-based regulation: A valuable tool in the
regulatory toolbox? In C. Coglianese and J. Nash (Eds.), Leveraging the private
sector: Management-based strategies for improving environmental performance.
Washington, DC: RFF Press.

38

Bennear, L.S. (2007). Are management-based regulations effective? Evidence from state
pollution prevention programs. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26, 32748.
Bennear, L.S. (2008). What do we really know? The effect of reporting thresholds on
inferences using environmental right-to-know data. Regulation & Governance, 2,
293-315.
Bennear, L. & Coglianese, C., (2013). Flexible approaches to environmental regulation. In
The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy, eds. Kraft, M. & Kamieniecki,
S. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bennear, L.S., & Olmstead, S.M. (2008). The impacts of the ‘right to know’: Information
disclosure and the violation of drinking water standards. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 56, 117-30.
Berkes, F., Reid, W.V., Wilbanks, T.J., & Capistrano, D. (2006). Bridging scales and
knowledge systems. In W. Reid, T. Wilbanks, D. Capistrano, and F. Berkes (Eds.),
Bridging scales and knowledge systems: Concepts and applications in ecosystem
assessment. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Black, J. (2008). Risk-based regulation: Choices, practices and lessons being learned. Paris:
OECD, 2008–SG/GRP4.
Bohensky, E.L., & Maru, Y. (2011). Indigenous knowledge, science, and resilience: What
have we learned from a decade of international literature on integration. Ecology and
Society, 16, 4-6.
Borck, J.C., & Coglianese, C. (2009). Voluntary environmental programs: Assessing their
effectiveness. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 34: 305-324.

39

Bounds, G. (2010). Challenges to designing regulatory policy frameworks to manage risks. In
Risks and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk. OECD.
Boyle, A. (2006) Human rights or environmental rights? A reassessment. Fordham
Environmental Law Review, 18(3).
Bronsteen, J., Buccafusco, C., & Masur, J.S. (2013). Well-being analysis vs. cost-benefit
analysis. Duke Law Journal, 62, 1603–1689.
Brown Weiss, E. (1989). In fairness to future generations: International Law, common
patrimony and intergenerational equity. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers.
Brown Weiss, E. (1990). Our rights and obligations to future generations for the
environment. American Journal of International Law, 84, 198-207.
Bulkeley, H., Andonova, L.B., Betsill, M.M., Compagnon, D., Hale, T., Hoffman, M.J.,
Newell, P., Paterson, M., VanDeever, S.D. & Roger, C. (2014). Transnational climate
change governance. Cambridge University Press.
Bullard, R.D. (2018). Dumping in Dixie: Race, class and environmental quality (3d ed.). New
York: Routledge.
Büscher, B. (2016) Reassessing Fortress Conservation? New Media and the Politics of
Distinction in Kruger National Park, Annals of the American Association of
Geographers, 106 (1), pp. 114-129.
Büthe, T. (2010). Private regulation in the global economy: A (p)review. Business and
Politics, 12(3), 1-38.
Büthe, T., & Mattli, W. (2011). The new global rulers: The privatization of regulation in the
world economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Büthe, T. (2012). Beyond supply and demand: A political-economic conceptual model. In
Davis, K., Fisher, A., Kingsbury, B., and Merry, S.E. (eds.), Governance by

40

indicators: Global power through classification and rankings. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Carson, R.T., Mitchell, R.C., Hanemann, W.M., Kopp, R.J., Presser, S., & Ruud, P.A.
(1992). A contingent valuation study of lost passive use values resulting from the
Exxon Valdez oil spill (No. 6984). University Library of Munich, Germany.
Cashore, B.W., Auld, G., &, Newsom D. (2004). Governing through markets: Forest
certification and the emergence of non-state authority. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Coase, R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Classic Papers in Natural Resource
Economics (87-137), Palgrave Macmillan, UK.
Coglianese, C. (2001). Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the
Environmental Movement. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 150 (1).
Coglianese, C. (2003). Is satisfaction success? Evaluating public participation in regulatory
policymaking. In R. O’Leary and L. Bingham (Eds.), The Promise and Performance
of Environmental Conflict Resolution. Washington, DC: RFF Press.
Coglianese, C. (2007). Business Interests and information in environmental rulemaking. In
Kraft, M. & Kamieniecki (Eds.), Business and environmental policy: Corporate
interests in the American political system. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Coglianese, C. (2017). The limits of performance-based regulation. Michigan Journal of Law
Reform, 50: 525-563.
Coglianese, C., & Lazer, D. (2003). Management-based regulation: Prescribing private
management to achieve public goals. Law & Society Review, 37, 691-730.
Coglianese, C., & Marchant, G. E. (2004). Shifting sands: The limits of science in setting risk
standards. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 152(4), 1255-1360.

41

Coglianese, C. & Nash, J. (2006). Management-based strategies: An emerging approach to
environmental protection. In C. Coglianese & J. Nash (Eds.), Leveraging the private
sector: Management-based strategies for improving environmental performance.
Washington, DC: RFF Press.
Coglianese, C., & Nash, J. (2014). Performance track's postmortem: Lessons from the rise
and fall of epa's ‘flagship' voluntary program. Harvard Environmental Law Review,
38, 14-18.
Coglianese, C., Nash, J., & Olmstead, T. (2003). Performance-based regulation: Prospects
and limitations in health, safety, and environmental protection. Administrative Law
Review, 55, 705–29.
Cohen, J., & Sabel, C. (2005). Global democracy. New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, 37(4).
Cole, L.W., & Foster, S.R. (2001). From the ground up: Environmental racism and the rise
of the environmental justice movement. New York: NYU Press.
Covello, V.T., & Mumpower, J. (1985). Risk analysis and risk management: An historical
perspective. Risk Analysis 5(2), 103–120.
Cropper, M.L., & Oates, W.E. (1992). Environmental economics: A survey. Journal of
Economic Literature, 30, (675–740).
Cropper, M., Hammitt, J.K., & Robinson, L.A. (2011). Valuing mortality risk reductions:
Progress and challenges. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 3, 313-336.
Daly, H. E. (1977). Steady-state economics: The economics of biophysical equilibrium and
moral growth. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
de Marchi, S., & Hamilton, J.T. (2006). Assessing the accuracy of self-reported data: An
evaluation of the toxics release inventory. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32, 57-76.

42

DeSombre, E.R. (2000). Domestic sources of international environmental policy: Industry,
environmentalists, and US power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of
technological and environmental dangers. Oakland, CA: University of California
Press.
Driesen, D. (2005). Distributing the cost of environmental, health, and safety protection: The
feasibility principle, cost-benefit analysis, and regulatory reform. Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review, 32(1), 34-38.
Dryzek, J. S. (2013). The politics of the earth : Environmental discourses. 3rd ed. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Durant, R.F., Fiorino, D.J. & O’Leary, R. eds. (2017). Environmental governance
reconsidered: Challenges, choices, and opportunities. MIT Press.
Eberlein, B., Abbot, K.W., Black, J., Meidinger, E. & Wood, S. (2014). Transnational
business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis. In
Regulation & Governance, 8(1), pp. 1-21.
Ehrlich P. (1968). The population bomb. New York: Ballantine Books.
Ellickson, R.C. (1986). Of coase and cattle: Dispute resolution among neighbors in shasta
county. Stanford Law Review, 38, 623-687.
Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McKay, B.J., & Acheson, J.M. (1990). The tragedy of the commons:
Twenty-two years later. Human Ecology, 18(1), 1-19.
Finkel, A.M., & Golding, D. (1995). Worst things first? The debate over risk-based national
environmental priorities. Washington, DC: RFF Press.

43

Fiorino, D. (2006). The new environmental regulation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Fiorino, D.J. (2018a). A good life on a finite Earth: The political economy of green growth.
Oxford University Press.
Fiorino, D.J. (2018b). Can democracy handle climate change? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fraser, E.D., Dougill, A.J., Mabee, W.E., Reed, M., & McAlpine, P. (2006). Bottom up and
top down: Analysis of participatory processes for sustainability indicator
identification as a pathway to community empowerment and sustainable
environmental management. Journal of Environmental Management, 78(2), 114-127.
Freestone, D., & Hey, E. (1996). Origins and development of the precautionary principle. In
D. Freestone and E. Hey (Eds.), The precautionary principle and international law (315). New York: Kluwer Law International.
Fung, A., & O’Rourke, D. (2000). “Reinventing environmental regulation from the grassroots
up: Explaining and expanding the success of the toxics release inventory.”
Environmental Management, 25, 115-27.
Gayer, T., & Viscusi, W.K. (2016). Determining the proper scope of climate change policy
benefits in U.S. regulatory analyses: Domestic versus global approaches. Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy, 10(2), 245–263.
Gordon, G.J. (2018). Environmental personhood. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law,
43:49-91.
Gramlich, E. (1990). A guide to benefit-cost analysis, 2nd ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland
Press.
Grant, D. & Jones A.W. (2004). Do manufacturers pollute less under the regulation-throughinformation regime? What plant-level data tell us. Sociological Quarterly, 45(3), 471486.

44

Grant, R.W. & Keohane, R.O. (2005). Accountability and abuses of power in world politics.
American Political Science Review, 99(1), 29-43.
Green, J.F. (2013). Rethinking private authority: Agents and entrepreneurs in global
environmental governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Guha, R. (2000). Environmentalism: A global history. New York: Longman.
Gulbrandsen, L.H. & Auld, G. (2019). Navigating contested accountability logics in nonstate
certification for fisheries sustainability. In Park, S. & Kramarz, T. Global
environmental governance and the accountability trap. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Haas, P.M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy
coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1-35.
Haas, P. M., Keohane, R. O., & Levy, M. A. (1993). Institutions for the earth: Sources of
effective international environmental protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hamilton, J.T. (1995). Pollution as news: Media and stock market reactions to the toxics
release inventory data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28,
98-113.
Hamilton, J.T. (2005). Regulation through revelation: The origin, politics and impacts of the
toxics release inventory program. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-48.
Hardin, R. (1982). Collective action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hawkins, K. (1984). Environment and enforcement: Regulation and the social definition of
pollution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoffman, M. J. (2011). Climate governance at the crossroads: Experimenting with a global
response after Kyoto. Oxford University Press.

45

Holland, B. (2008). Justice and the environment in Nussbaum's “Capabilities Approach”:
Why sustainable ecological capacity is a meta-capability, Political Research
Quarterly, 61(2), 319-332.
Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among
Western publics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and
political change in 43 societies (Vol. 19). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jaffe, A.B., Newell, R.G., & Stavins, R.N. (2004). Technology policy for energy and the
environment. In A.B. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the
Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jasanoff, S.S. (1987). Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science, Social Studies of
Science, 17, 195-230.
Jasanoff, S. (2009). The fifth branch: Science advisers as policymakers. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Kahan, D., Jenkins-Smith, H., Braman, D., Kahan, D., Jenkins‐Smith, H., & Braman, D.
(2011). Cultural cognition of scientific consensus. Journal of Risk Research, 14(2),
147–174.
Kamieniecki, S. and Kraft, M. eds. (2013). The Oxford handbook of US environmental policy.
Oxford University Press.
Karkkainen, B.C. (2001). Information as environmental regulation: TRI and performance
benchmarking, precursor to a new paradigm? Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 257-370.
Kaufman, H. (1967). The forest ranger: A study in administrative behavior. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press.

46

Kelley, J., & Simmons, B. (2019). The power of global performance indicators. International
Organization, 1-20.
Kelman, S. (1981). Cost-benefit analysis: An ethical critique. Regulation, 5, 33.
Keohane, N., Revesz, R. & Stavins, R.N. (1998). The choice of regulatory instruments in
environmental policy. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 22: 313–367.
Keohane, R.O. (2001). Governance in a partially globalized world. American Political Science
Review, 95: 1-13.
Keohane, R.O. (2003). Global governance and democratic accountability. In Held, D., &
Koenig-Archibugi, M. (eds.) Taming globalization: Frontiers of governance.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Keohane, R.O., & Ostrom, E. (Eds.). (1994). Local commons and global interdependence.
London: Sage.
Khanna, M., Quimio, W.R.H., & Bojilova, D. (1998). Toxics release information: A policy
tool for environmental protection. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 36(3), 243-66.
Kingdon, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. New York: Longman.
Konar, S., & Cohen, M.A. (1997). Information as regulation: The effect of community right
to know laws on toxic emissions. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 32, 109-24.
Konisky, D. M. (2015). Failed promises: Evaluating the federal government's response to
environmental justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Kraft, M. E., Stephan, M., & Abel, T.D. (2011). Coming clean: Information disclosure and
environmental performance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

47

Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review,
45, 1-28.
Levi-Faur, D. & Starobin, S. (2014). Transnational politics and policy: From two-way to
three-way interactions. Jerusalem Papers in Regulation and Governance No 62.
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services.
New York: Russell Sage.
Lyon, T., & Maxwell, J. (2004). Corporate environmentalism and public policy. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Masur, J., & Posner, E. (2010). Against feasibility analysis. University of Chicago Law
Review, 77, 657-716.
Matson, P., Clark, W.C., & Andersson, K. (2016). Pursuing sustainability: A guide to the
science and practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mattor, K., Betsill, M., Huayhuaca, C., Huber-Stearns, H., Jedd, T., Sternlieb, F., Bixler, P.,
Luizza, M. & Cheng, A.S. (2014). Transdisciplinary tesearch on environmental
governance: A view from the inside. In Environmental Science & Policy (42): 90-100.
May, P.J. (2003). Performance-based regulation and regulatory regimes: The saga of leaky
buildings. Law and Policy, 25, 381-401.
May, P.J. (2011). Performance-based regulation. In D. Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the
Politics of Regulation. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Mazmanian, D.A. & Kraft, M.E. (2009). Toward sustainable communities: Transitions and
transformations in environmental policy. MIT Press.
McCay, B. J., & Acheson, J. M. (Eds.) (1987). The question of the commons. The culture and
ecology of communal resources. University of Arizona Press, Tucson.

48

Melnick, R. S. (1983). Regulation and the courts: The case of the Clean Air Act. Washington,
DC: Brookings.
Mendelsohn, R., & Olmstead, S. (2009). The economic valuation of environmental amenities
and disamenities: Methods and applications. Annual Review of Environment and
Resources, 34, 325-347.
Mitchell, R.B. (2003). International environmental agreements: A survey of their features,
formation, and effects. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 28(1), 429461.
Mitchell, R. B., Clark, W. C., & Cash, D. W. (2006). Information and influence. In Mitchell,
R. B., Cash, D. W., Clark, W. C., Dickson, N. M., & Gasser, L. (Eds.). Global
environmental assessments: Information and influence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Morgenstern, R.D., & Pizer, W.A. eds. (2007). The nature and performance of voluntary
environmental programs in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future.
Munasinghe, M. (1999). Is environmental degradation an inevitable consequence of
economic growth?: Tunneling through the environmental Kuznets curve. Ecological
Economics, 29 (1): 89–109.
Natan, T.E. Jr., & Miller, C.G. (1998). Are toxics release inventory reductions real?
Environmental Science & Technology, 32, 368A-74A.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2018). Designing Safety
Regulation for High-Hazard Industries. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24907.
Naess, A. (1973). The shallow and the deep, long‐range ecology movement: A summary.
Inquiry (16): 95-100.

49

Newell, R.G., & Rogers, K. (2003). The market-based lead phasedown. RFF Discussion
Paper 03-37. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
O'Neill, K. (2009). The environment and international relations. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Okun, A. (1975). Equality and efficiency: The big tradeoff. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Ophuls, W. (1977). Ecology and the politics of scarcity. San Francisco: W.H. Freedman.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2008). The challenge of common-pool resources. Environment: Science and
Policy for Sustainable Development, 50(4), 8-21.
Palmer, K., Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (1995). Tightening environmental standards: The
benefit-costs or the no-cost paradigm? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 119132.
Paoli, G., & Wiles, A. (2015). Key analytical capabilities of a best-in-class regulator.
Research paper prepared for the Penn Program on Regulation’s Best-in-Class
Regulator Initiative.
Park, S. & Kramarz, T. (2019). Does accountability matter for global environmental
governance? In Park, S. & Kramarz, T. (eds.) Global environmental governance and
the accountability trap. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pigou, A.C. (1932). The economics of welfare. London: MacMillan and Co.
Pizer, W.A., Morgenstern, R., & Shih, J.S. (2010). The performance of voluntary climate
programs: Climate wise and 1605(b). Resources for the Future. Discussion Paper No.
08-13-REV.

50

Poje, G.V., & Horowitz, D.M. (1990). Phantom reductions: Tracking toxic trends.
Washington, DC: National Wildlife Federation.
Porter, M. E, & van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environmentcompetitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 97-118.
Prakash, A., & Potoski, M. (2006). The voluntary environmentalists: Green clubs, ISO
14001, and voluntary environmental regu/lations. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Press, D. (2007). Industry, Environmental Policy, and Environmental Outcomes. Annual
Review of Environmental Resources, 32, 317-44.
Pressman, J.L. & Wildavsky, A. (1984). Implementation. University of California Press.
Rabe, B.G. (2004). Statehouse and greenhouse: The emerging politics of American climate
change policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
Rabe, B.G. (2018a). Can we price carbon?. MIT Press.
Rabe, B.G. (2018b). Racing to the top, the bottom, or the middle of the pack? The evolving
state government role in environmental protection. In N.J. Vig & M.E. Kraft (Eds.),
Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century 10th Edition.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Revesz, R.L. (1992). Rehabilitating interstate competition: Rethinking the race-to-the-bottom
rationale for federal environmental regulation. New York University Law Review, 67,
1210-1254.
Revesz, R.L. (1999). Environmental regulation, cost-benefit analysis, and the discounting of
human lives. Columbia Law Review, 99, 941-1017.
Richards, K.R. (2000). Framing environmental policy instrument choice. Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 10, 221-85.

51

Robinson, L.A., Hammitt, J.K., & Zeckhauser, R.J. (2016). Attention to distribution in U.S.
regulatory analyses. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 10(2): 308–328.
Roger, C., Hale, T. & Andonova, L. (2017). The comparative politics of transnational climate
governance. International Interactions, 43(1), pp. 1-25.
Rolston, H. (1988). Environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1995). Controlling environmental policy: The limits of public law in
Germany and the United States. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rothstein, H., Irving, P., Walden, T., & Yearsley, R. (2006). The risks of risk-based
regulation: Insights from the environmental policy domain. Environment
International, 32, 8, 1056-1065.
Rowell, A., & Wexler, L. (2014). Valuing foreign lives. Georgia Law Review 48: 499-578.
Sagoff, M. (1988). The economy of the earth: Philosophy, law, and the environment.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schreurs, M. (2003). Environmental politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schwarz, M., & Thompson, M. (1990). Divided we stand: Redefining politics, technology
and social choice. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Shelton, D. (1991). Human rights, environmental rights and the right to environment.
Stanford Journal of International Law, 28(1): 103–138.
Simon, J. (1977). The economics of population growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.

52

Singleton, S. (2000). Co‐operation or capture? The paradox of co‐management and
community participation in natural resource management and environmental policy‐
making. Environmental Politics, 9(2),1-21.
Slaughter, A. (2005). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1981). Facts and fears: Societal perception of
risk. In K. B. Monroe (Eds.), Advances in consumer research (497-502). Ann Arbor,
MI: Association for Consumer Research.
Starobin, S. M. (2013). Global companies as agents of globalization. In J. Mikler (ed.), The
handbook of global companies (405-420). Oxford, UK: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Starobin, S. M. (2018). Beekeepers versus biotech: Commodity characteristics and regulatory
interdependence in the global environmental politics of food. Global Environmental
Politics, 18(2), 114-133.
Starobin, S., & Weinthal, E. (2010). The search for credible information in social and
environmental global governance: The Kosher label. Business and Politics, 12(3), 135.
Stavins, R.N. (2007). Market-based environmental policies: What can we learn from U.S.
experience (and related research)? In J. Freeman and C.D. Kolstad (Eds.), Moving to
markets in environmental regulation: Lessons from twenty years of experience. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Steinberg, P.F., & VanDeveer, S.D. eds. (2012). Comparative Environmental Politics:
Theory, practice, and prospects. MIT Press.
Stern, P.C., & Fineberg, H.V. (Eds.). (1996). Understanding risk: Informing decisions in a
democratic society. National Academies Press.

53

Stone, C. (2010). Should trees have standing?: Law, morality, and the environment. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Sunstein, C.R. (1999). Informational regulation and informational standing: Akins and
beyond. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 147, 613-75.
Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle. Cambridge
University Press.
Susskind, L.E. (1994). Environmental diplomacy: Negotiating more effective environmental
agreements. New York: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, D. E. (2014). Toxic communities: Environmental racism, industrial pollution, and
residential mobility. New York: New York University Press.
Thaler, R.H., & Sunstein, C.R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and
happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tietenberg, T.H. (1985). Emissions trading: An exercise in reforming pollution policy.
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press.
Tietenberg, T.H. (1998). Disclosure strategies for pollution control. Environmental &
Resource Economics, 11, 587-602.
Tyler, T., & Markell, D.L. (2008). Using empirical research to design government citizen
participation processes: A case study of citizens' roles in environmental compliance
and enforcement. Kansas Law Review, 57(1), 7-14.
Vandenbergh, M. & Gillian, J. (2017). Beyond politics: The private governance response to
climate change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Vig, N.J., & Kraft, M.E. eds. (2018). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the TwentyFirst Century 10th Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

54

Viscusi, W.K. (1993). The value of risks to life and health. Journal of Economic Literature,
31(4), 1912-1946.
Viscusi, W. K., & Aldy, J. E. (2003). The value of a statistical life: A critical review of
market estimates throughout the world. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 27, 5-76.
Vogel, D. (2009). Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wiener, J.B. (2007). Think globally, act globally: The limits of local climate policies.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, 1961-1979.
Wiener, J. (2010). Risk regulation and governance institutions. In OECD, risk and regulatory
policy: Improving the governance of risk, OECD reviews of regulatory reform.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our common future: Report of
the world commission on environment and development, UN Documents Gathering a
Body of Global Agreements.
Wynne, B. (1996). A reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide. Risk, environment
and modernity: Towards a new ecology (44-83). London: Sage.
Young, O.R. (1999). The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Causal
connections and behavioral mechanisms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, O.R. (2002). The institutional dimensions of environmental change: Fit, interplay,
and scale. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, O.R. (2013). On environmental governance: Sustainability, efficiency, and equity.
New York: Routledge.
Zerbe, R.O., & McCurdy, H.E. (1999). The failure of market failure. Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 18(4), 558-578.

55

